COMMENT

UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS: WHY WE NEED TO KNOW MORE
ABOUT HOW THE GOVERNMENT STIFLES
THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION
FROM FOREIGNERS ONLINE
APRATIM VIDYARTHI†
The First Amendment right to receive information ensures that where speakers
are free to speak, listeners receive their speech. In theory, this right has been enshrined
through doctrine, and is critical in protecting the First Amendment’s goals of truthseeking, self-governance, and self-realization. In practice, with respect to foreign
speech online, the right to receive is not realized, impacting the First Amendment’s
goals. Courts have repeatedly struck down right to receive claims because of
inadequate standing. The government also cooperates with technology companies to
take down (foreign) content and monitor (foreign) speakers, which prevents
Americans from seeing information sent their way, both directly and through speaker
self-censorship. The government’s foreign policy moves in banning apps and

† Philanthropy Editor, Volume 170, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 2022,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.S. 2016, Carnegie Mellon University; B.S., B.A. 2015,
University of California, Berkeley.
I am grateful to Professor Amanda Shanor for her mentorship, guidance, and critiques of this
piece. I am also thankful to my parents, without whom I would not have a penchant for debate and
free speech, or an affinity for civil rights. Finally, I am thankful to Sarah Byrne, without whose
encouragement and discussions I would not have written this Comment, and to Grayson Dimick,
without whose support I would not have gone to law school. I also owe eternal gratitude to the
editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for making this piece better than I alone could
ever make it.

(1341)

1342

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 170: 1129

pressuring technology companies to remove adversarial leaders also impact this right.
These moves mean that listeners do not know what they do not know.
Despite these infringements, it is incredibly difficult to litigate the right to receive.
Listeners may not have standing, as they do not know what they do not hear. The
Court also defers heavily to the government on alleged issues of national security,
which may be implicated with foreign speech. Some such speech could also be
considered inciting, though not in line with traditional incitement doctrine. And the
nature of the Internet makes it difficult to find plaintiffs whose rights may have been
violated. Instead of litigation, legislation is a better avenue of protecting this right.
Such legislation could encourage transparency of technology companies, and ensure
the government is held accountable for content takedowns and chilled speech online.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2019, Chinese doctor Li Wenliang sent a group message to
his colleagues, noting the lab results of patients in Wuhan who exhibited
SARS-like symptoms.1 Screenshots of these messages spread across the
Chinese Internet.2 One month later, Dr. Li blogged about his experience
being interrogated by Chinese authorities, as well as information about a
coronavirus disease.3 The post spread globally,4 even though President Trump
had said that he trusted the Chinese authorities and that the situation was
under control a few days prior.5 Facebook, reactionary as ever, began to
remove conspiracies related to the virus.6 Was Dr. Li’s post a conspiracy?
Were his words endangering American lives? Could the U.S. government
have pressured Facebook to remove traces of this alternative theory to the
official Chinese version? In theory, no: the First Amendment right to receive
information would prevent the government from doing so. But practically, if
the government chose to pressure technology companies to do so, we would
never know. The depths of what we do not know is not known: these are the
unknown unknowns around whether our right to receive is realized.
The right to receive information is a corollary of the First Amendment,
which regulates the government’s ability to prevent or stifle what kind of
information people receive. This right was originally derived in the 1960s, at
a time of heightened sensitivity and anxiety over alleged communist influence
of American institutions following the peak of the Second Red Scare.7 The
right still applies in the digital era because while the Internet is many
1 Stephanie Hegarty, The Chinese Doctor Who Tried to Warn Others About Coronavirus, BBC (Feb.
6, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-51364382 [https://perma.cc/X76U-6TKD].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., Cristian Martini Grimaldi, Così il Regime Minacciò i Medici Sul Virus: “State Zitti, è a
Rischio L’ordine Sociale, LA STAMPA (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.lastampa.it/topnews/primopiano/2020/02/01/news/cosi-il-regime-minaccio-i-medici-sul-virus-state-zitti-e-a-rischio-l-ordinesociale-1.38408749 [https://perma.cc/Y5JP-GVRZ] (describing Dr. Li’s post in an Italian publication).
5 Matthew J. Belvedere, Trump Says He Trusts China’s Xi on Coronavirus and the US Has It ‘Totally
Under Control,’ CNBC (Jan. 22, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/trump-oncoronavirus-from-china-we-have-it-totally-under-control.html [https://perma.cc/Y77P-YHPC].
6 Katie Paul, As Coronavirus Misinformation Spreads on Social Media, Facebook Removes Posts,
REUTERS (Jan. 31, 2020, 7:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-facebook/ascoronavirus-misinformation-spreads-on-social-media-facebook-removes-posts-idUSKBN1ZV388
[https://perma.cc/34B8-KE4L].
7 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1964) (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing
the right to receive as a “fundamental right”).
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unregulated things—a source of education,8 a wellspring of memes,9 and
allegedly a series of tubes10—the U.S. government through its employees11 and
as an entity12 plays a role in shaping speech online. Applied to cyberspace, the
right to receive protects listener access to speech both by foreign and domestic
speakers.13 This right furthers the broad goals of the First Amendment,
including goals of truth-seeking, self-governance, and self-realization.14
But the story is not as rosy as described on paper. In theory, the right to
receive protects listeners’ rights under the First Amendment. This Comment
argues that in practice, there are too many unknown unknowns to tell whether
the federal government is stifling our right to receive information, leading to
a pernicious impact on our First Amendment rights. What we do know is that
the government’s powers in policing the border, implementing foreign policy
through Executive authority, and cooperating with technology companies
seriously endanger the right to receive information. And shedding light on
whether our right to receive is being stifled faces not hurdles, but mountains.
A potential plaintiff faces a quartet of troubles: attaining standing,
overcoming deference to the government’s national security authority,
handling First Amendment incitement doctrine, and dealing with practical
issues regarding litigating Internet cases.
This Comment explores the right to receive information in practice. Part
I provides context, defining why such speech is valuable, and giving a brief
background of the right to receive doctrine. Part II compares this doctrine to
reality, investigating how the right holds up in existing cases, the
government’s use of foreign policy to stifle the right, and the government’s
cooperation with technology companies to quietly remove and chill speech,
8 See, e.g., Alexandra Brod, Zoom School of Law: From Meme to Moneymaker, AM. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 1,
2020), https://abaforlawstudents.com/2020/11/01/zoom-school-of-law-from-meme-to-moneymaker
[https://perma.cc/YV56-MAUJ] (describing the transition to online law school amid the
COVID-19 pandemic).
9 See, e.g., Law School Memes for Edgy T14s, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/groups/lsm4et14s/
[https://perma.cc/S3EG-WNMJ] (displaying a series of memes about legal education).
10 The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: From Here to Neutrality (Comedy Central television
broadcast Oct. 26, 2009), https://www.cc.com/video/blvwyz/the-daily-show-with-jon-stewart-fromhere-to-neutrality [https://perma.cc/UN8M-KNUA] (lampooning the dubious claim of U.S.
Senator Ted Stevens that “the Internet is a series of tubes”).
11 See, e.g., Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump
[https://perma.cc/9C33-XPDB], (showing former President Trump’s former Twitter account, which Twitter
suspended for inciting violence); Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension [https://perma.cc/TGS7-X3CF].
12 See infra Part II (discussing how the government shapes online speech).
13 Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 278-79, 282, 291, 305 (2018).
14 Id. at 309-13.
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raising the question: how much information is being taken down that we don’t
know about? Part III discusses hurdles in bringing successful litigation.
Finally, Part IV discusses two solutions: holding technology companies
accountable for transparency, and legislation requiring government
transparency regarding online speech.
While American Internet users have the right to receive information from
foreigners over the Internet, in practice the government’s policies mean we
don’t know what we don’t know; and the right to receive may be a victim of
that unknown unknown. As the Internet’s role in American politics and its
use by foreign adversaries to influence citizens increases, the government’s
approach to these issues must be constrained by the right to receive foreign
speech.15 How the government approaches this new era of digital democracy
will shape the extent to which the First Amendment protects free speech, or
whether the content we don’t know and don’t see expands in quantity.
I. THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION DOCTRINE
The First Amendment, despite its acclaim and importance, mentions the
word “speech” just once: “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”16 Yet these fourteen words imply
more than just the right to free speech. The Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence has recognized various corollaries that derive
from the right to free speech: rights to free association,17 to anonymous
speech,18 and to receive information are three of many. While the right to
receive is not in the Constitution’s text, it arises naturally from the nature of
free speech: where speech is unabridged, a listener’s right to hear that
uncensored speech too should be unabridged.
While the right to receive originates from the American Constitution, it
covers receiving nearly all speech, including foreign speech.19 And foreign
15 See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima & Craig Timberg, U.S. Agencies Mount Major Effort to Prevent
Russian Interference in the Election Even Though Trump Downplays Threat, WASH. POST (Oct. 21,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/us-defends-russian-electioninterference/2020/10/21/533b508a-130a-11eb-bc10-40b25382f1be [https://perma.cc/85WS-PMJF]
(describing the National Security Agency’s response to Russian cyberattacks).
16 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (“Inviolability of
privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom
of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs . . . .”).
18 See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (striking down a law requiring the
provision of the publisher’s identification on flyers, because “an identification requirement would
tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression”).
19 See Thai, supra note 13, at 282.
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that make it invaluable to realizing the
and expression enshrined in the First
the benefits of foreign speech, and then
receive doctrine and how that applies to

A. Why Protect Foreign Speech?
There are at least three goals of free speech21 under the First Amendment:
truth seeking,22 self-governance,23 and self-realization.24 Foreign speech is
essential to realizing these goals. A Maldivian expressing the effects of
climate change on their islands helps Americans realize the veracity and harm
of climate change.25 Young Iranians expressing disenfranchisement due to
American sanctions help Americans determine whether their elected officials’
foreign policy is succeeding.26 And global protests against racism might
change an American’s perspective on systemic racism.27
Yet, as we shall see, the government’s current policies with respect to
foreign speech mean that we do not know whether the policies are filtering
out objectively harmful speech, or speech the government considers
For a deeper look at the theoretical right to receive, see id. at 278-309.
For an exhaustive list of theories of free speech, see Amanda Shanor, First Amendment
Coverage, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 318, 328 n.41 (2018) for summaries of some scholars’ interpretations of
the right to free speech.
22 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 172 (1999) (discussing truth-seeking and self-governance).
23 See, e.g., Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF.
L. REV. 2355, 2356, 2363 (2000) (articulating First Amendment theories of truth-seeking and selfgovernance); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (noting the First Amendment’s intent is to
create “a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity”).
24 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982)
(writing that the goal of free speech is “individual self-realization”); Whitney v. California 274 U.S.
357, 375 (1927) (“[F]reedom to . . . speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth . . . .”).
25 See, e.g., Alasdair Pal & Devjyot Ghoshal, ‘We Can’t Wait’: Maldives Desperate for Funds as Islands
Risk Going Under, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2020, 4:23 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-changemaldives/we-cant-wait-maldives-desperate-for-funds-as-islands-risk-going-under-idUSKBN1ZG0XS
[https://perma.cc/V5CP-7D9U] (describing the impact of climate change on the Maldives).
26 See, e.g., DJAVAD SALEHI-ISFAHANI, IRAN’S YOUTH, THE UNINTENDED VICTIMS OF
SANCTIONS, BELFER CTR. 2, 4-6 (2010), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/
publication/Salehi-Isfahani_DI-Policy-Brief_Iran-Youth.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D2N-WYRP] (describing
the effect of American sanctions on Iranian youth).
27 See, e.g., Daimen Cave, Livia Albeck-Ripka & Iliana Magra, Huge Crowds Around the Globe March
in Solidarity Against Police Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/06/world/georgefloyd-global-protests.html [https://perma.cc/V7LS-JEG9] (June 9, 2020) (describing the global reach of the
2020 George Floyd protests).
20
21
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subjectively harmful but still helps seek truth, self-governance, or selfrealization. And given the rudimentary policy solutions in response to foreign
election interference and disinformation campaigns during the 2016 and 2020
elections, and during the COVID-19 pandemic, it seems probable that foreign
speech is likely to bear the brunt of such policies in the near future.28 These
policies risk losing the benefits of foreign speech: providing diverse
perspectives that encourage truth seeking, broadening information access that
informs self-governance, and providing external input to closed ecosystems
that might help self-realization.
Foreign speech encourages truth-seeking by providing diverse
perspectives. Such varied perspectives create an “atmosphere of ‘speculation,
experiment and creation’” that provokes a “‘robust exchange of ideas,’”29
leading to “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate and discussion.30
Given the non-geographic, boundaryless nature of the Internet, online speech
facilitates discussion when it includes foreign speakers rather than exclusively
American views. Open debate and discussion take place when speech is not
chilled, and instead grant listeners the liberty to decide whether (foreign)
speech is relevant, important, and true.31 Foreign speech is also essential for
dialogue across religions, for entrepreneurship, and for accountability against
misinformation and authoritarianism.32
Further, foreign speech—especially on the Internet—improves selfgovernance within the United States.33 It helps ensure accountability as the
United States continues to be a global superpower whose foreign policy spans
continents. Foreign speech can provide uniquely accurate information about
the United States’ actions in foreign issues, encouraging policymakers and
voters to hold elected officials and the military accountable. For example,
Iraqi witnesses initially reported the U.S. military’s civilian massacre in

28 See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Free Speech Will Save Our Democracy: The First Amendment in the Age
of Disinformation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/13/magazine/freespeech.html [https://perma.cc/R66Y-MZWW] (discussing President Biden’s calls for revoking
section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which makes Internet platforms immune from
libel and other civil suits, to incentivize companies to remove “falsehoods they know to be false”).
29 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978).
30 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
31 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (discussing the First
Amendment’s truth-seeking function).
32 Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on Internet Freedom, Address Before the
Newseum (Jan. 21, 2010), https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/01/135519.htm
[https://perma.cc/74BL-W7DQ].
33 For a more thorough discussion, see Thai, supra note 13, at 311-13.
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Haditha in 2005.34 Time Magazine’s reporting led to the investigation35 and
prosecution of soldiers involved36 and changed lawmakers’ support of the Iraq
war.37 Foreign speech is also useful in ensuring that American officials are
doing their job serving and protecting American citizens. For example, a
British whistleblower provided evidence to American regulators about
international market manipulation by banks,38 and a Chinese whistleblower
was central to warning the world about COVID-19.39
Finally, foreign speech furthers the First Amendment goal of selfrealization through “individual freedom of mind [rather than] disciplined
uniformity”40 by providing heterogenous information sources that pierce
information bubbles and expand perspective. It also creates a more robust
information market, which achieves the First Amendment goal of allowing
the listener to make more informed “life-affecting decisions” to help achieve
personal goals.41 Such decisions may come in the form of opportunities. For
example, scientific exchanges between the United States and Russia during
the Cold War developed trust and facilitated collaboration, furthering
scientific discoveries and careers.42 But these life-affecting decisions go
beyond personal success. Self-realization includes human development,43 and
foreign speech is necessary to help engender empathy and understanding of
34 See Tim McGirk, Collateral Damage or Civilian Massacre in Haditha, TIME (Mar. 19, 2006),
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1174649,00.html [https://perma.cc/7GGZ-J2VL]
(“But the details of what happened that morning in Haditha are more disturbing, disputed and
horrific than the military initially reported.”).
35 Associated Press, Evidence Suggests Haditha Killings Deliberate: Pentagon Source, CBC NEWS (Aug. 2,
2006, 11:08 AM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/evidence-suggests-haditha-killings-deliberatepentagon-source-1.576884 [https://perma.cc/YPR8-W9WG].
36 See, e.g., Charlie Savage & Elisabeth Bumiller, An Iraqi Massacre, a Light Sentence, and a
Question of Military Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/us/aniraqi-massacre-a-light-sentence-and-a-question-of-military-justice.html [https://perma.cc/C3NQP2X9] (detailing the prosecution, acquittal, and plea deals of various soldiers involved in the incident).
37 See, e.g., Jamie McIntyre, Lawmaker Says Marines Killed Iraqis ‘in Cold Blood’, CNN (May 19,
2006, 3:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/05/18/murtha.marines/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7U3W-CNSC] (describing Representative Murtha’s commentary over the
Haditha killings, and his continued distancing from the Iraq war, which he originally supported).
38 Michael Gray, JPMorgan ‘Chase’ Story in UK, N.Y. POST (Mar. 29, 2010, 4:00 AM),
https://nypost.com/2010/03/29/jpmorgan-chase-story-in-uk [https://perma.cc/3XLW-WDNQ] (describing
the role a British metals trader played in uncovering market manipulation by JPMorgan).
39 See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying discussion.
40 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
41 Redish, supra note 24, at 593.
42 Siegfried S. Hecker, When Science Brought Americans and Russians Together, BULLETIN OF
THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Apr. 11, 2017), https://thebulletin.org/2017/04/when-science-broughtamericans-and-russians-together/ [https://perma.cc/WJE3-MFWA].
43 Redish, supra note 24, at 593.
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different cultures, given the United States’ contentious relationship with
immigration and the current increase in xenophobia and nationalism.44
Despite these benefits, there may be foreign speech listeners do not like.
Among other concerns, such speech can sow disinformation and can
encourage terrorism. But these dislikes are subjective, and domestic speech
carries similar harms: domestic speech is rife with misinformation,45 and
homegrown extremism and domestic terrorism (exacerbated by
misinformation)46 are a bigger threat than foreign terrorism.47 More
importantly, the government’s role as an arbitrator of what foreign speech is
acceptable and what is too dangerous leaves listeners in the dark, unknowing
of what they cannot hear. One way to reduce our unknown unknowns is
through the right to receive information.
B. The Doctrine of Right to Receive Information
The right to receive information encompasses speech occurring in most
venues, and containing all ideas. But the Court started small. The right was
first articulated in Martin v. City of Struthers. Striking down an ordinance that
made it unlawful for people distributing literature to ring doorbells or
summon the occupants of a home, the Court reasoned that freedom of speech
encouraged the spread of ideas, which required the right to receive literature
(and thus beliefs).48 In Thomas v. Collins, the Court struck down a statute
requiring labor organizers to register with the state before speaking to
workers about joining the union, since such a statute restricted the right to
44 See, e.g., Michael Balsamo, Hate Crimes in US Reach Highest Level in More than a Decade,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 16, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/hate-crimes-rise-FBI-dataebbcadca8458aba96575da905650120d (describing an upsurge in hate crimes, reflecting xenophobia
and nationalism, in 2020); Florian Bieber, Is Nationalism on the Rise? Assessing Global Trends, 17
ETHNOPOLITICS 519, 519 (2018) (discussing that some countries, such as the United States, have
seen increasing nationalism).
45 See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, The Disinformation Problem Starts at Home, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2019, 8:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/disinformation-domestic-problem/ [https://perma.cc/X75YQ3DV] (discussing anti-vaccine pages, political disinformation, and conspiracy theories originating from
the United States).
46 See, e.g., Eileen Sullivan & Kate Benner, Top Law Enforcement Officials Say the Biggest Domestic Terror
Threat Comes from White Supremacists, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/12/us/politics/domesticterror-white-supremacists.html (June 15, 2021) [https://perma.cc/CJT5-YFJ3] (“[F]ormer members of the
Trump administration told the House Oversight Committee that Mr. Trump’s false claims to have
won the 2020 election had fueled the domestic terrorism threat . . . .”).
47 Neil MacFarquhar, As Domestic Terrorists Outpace Jihadists, New U.S. Law Is Debated, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/25/us/domestic-terrorism-laws.html
[https://perma.cc/CJT5-YFJ3].
48 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
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speak, as well as the “rights of the workers to hear” what the union had to
say.49 Rounding out this early trilogy of cases establishing the right is Lamont
v. Postmaster General. The Court considered a statute that allowed the
Secretary of the Treasury to designate non-sealed political propaganda
originating from adversarial countries as “communist political propaganda.”50
The Postmaster General would hold and destroy such propaganda unless the
receiver specifically asked for it to be delivered.51 In a unanimous decision,
the Court struck down the statute.52 Justice Brennan concurred, noting that
the “[g]overnment is powerless to interfere with the delivery of the material
because the First Amendment ‘necessarily protects the right to receive it.’”53
The Court then quickly expanded the right to receive to other locations,
subject matter, and ideas. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court used the right
to receive information in the home as a means of expanding access to
contraceptives.54 The Court stated that “the State may not, consistently with
the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available
knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes . . . the right
to receive.”55 In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court addressed the private possession
of “obscene matter” on film.56 Relying upon the right to receive information,
the Court noted that such a right is fundamental to “free society” and
intersects with the “right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”57 Thus, Stanley
had the right to read or observe whatever he wanted, and the State could not
invade the privacy of his home to regulate what he watched.58 Finally, in Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Court outlined the expansiveness of this right
to receive, finding that the public has the right to receive information pertaining
to “social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences.”59
In combination, these cases indicate that the right to receive information
intersects with the right to privately consume information at home, and that
the right expands across any subject matter that makes our society free. Since
most online speech falls within “social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

323 U.S. 516, 532, 534 (1945).
381 U.S. 301, 302 (1965).
Id. at 302-03.
Id. at 306-07.
Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring).
381 U.S. 479, 482, 485 (1965).
Id. at 482.
394 U.S. 557, 558 & n.1 (1969).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 565.
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).

2022]

Unknown Unknowns

1351

ideas and experiences”60 and is received within the privacy of our homes, the
government cannot filter what listeners choose to see without satisfying
heightened scrutiny.61 However, this changes where the origin of speech is
beyond the border.
C. Foreign Speech and the Right to Receive Information
This expansive right to receive information is complicated by the Court’s
immigration jurisprudence and its deference to Congress and the Executive
on border issues. Foreigners within the United States have First Amendment
rights similar to those of American citizens.62 In contrast, the government is
not prevented from excluding foreign speakers or speech from entering the
country for various reasons, including because of their speech and ideas.63
Both foreign speakers and ideas can be prevented from entering the country
through immigration and import laws respectively, both of which can
supersede the right to receive.
Generally, foreigners residing within the United States have First
Amendment rights.64 But the situation is more complex for those living
outside the United States. In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Court addressed
whether the government could deny a visa to a foreigner who sought to
participate in academic lectures about socialism in the United States.65 The
Court found that Mandel, the foreigner, had no constitutional right of entry
as a nonimmigrant.66 But the Court went further, finding that although
citizens had a right to receive information, Congress’ “power to make rules
for the admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those
characteristics which Congress has forbidden” took precedent.67 Thus, the
Court would not inquire further and would accept the Executive’s facially

Id.
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (noting that a statute infringing
the right to receive must survive “exacting scrutiny,” which requires that the state show “a subordinating
interest which is compelling” and a “closely drawn” policy).
62 See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (“[F]reedom of speech and of press is
accorded aliens residing in this country.”) (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941)).
63 See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 580 (1952) (upholding a statute that
allowed deporting aliens due to former Communist Party membership).
64 See Wixon, 326 U.S. at 148 (“Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in
this country.”).
65 408 U.S. 753, 756-57 (1972).
66 Id. at 762.
67 Id. at 766 (quoting Boutilier v. Immig. & Naturalization Serv., 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967)).
60
61
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legitimate reasoning in exercising its Congressionally-delegated right to deny
Mandel entry,68 and “First Amendment rights could not override” that.69
While the Court’s decision in Mandel was based on a person entering the
country, in United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm Film, the Court went
further, allowing the government to stop the flow of “obscene material” (such
as films, books, and pamphlets) across the border and into the country.70 The
Court doubled down on Mandel, noting that even for materials that have to
do with private consumption, import restrictions “rest on different
considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic
regulations.”71 While the Court did not distinguish Lamont, which also dealt
with foreign imports, it noted the narrowness of Stanley’s ruling, finding that
it rested on an “explicitly narrow and precisely delineated privacy right.”72
The final principle pertaining to foreign speech arises in Citizens United
v. FEC, where the Court ruled unconstitutional a statute that banned
corporate-funded independent expenditures, because “the First Amendment
generally prohibits the suppression of political speech based on the speaker’s
identity.”73 While this principle is broad, the Court did not rule explicitly on
whether expenditure bans applied to foreigners.74 Later, the Court affirmed—
without providing reasoning—the ban on foreigners engaging in U.S.
political activity.75 Thus, foreign speakers’ political speech cannot, in some
ways, be received by those in the United States. Additionally, in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, the Court upheld a statute that forbade providing
legal representation and training to foreign organizations defined by the
Executive as terrorist groups,76 permitting the discrimination of the right to
receive based on the nationality of the receiver (in this case, the foreign
terrorist organization). But the Court’s reasoning was premised on why strict
scrutiny was the most appropriate standard, rather than focusing any analysis
Id. at 770.
Id. at 767. Congress has also created statutory protections and barriers to prevent some
foreign speakers from entering, based on their speech. Currently, the PATRIOT and REAL ID acts
bar foreign speakers with a history of espousing terrorist activity from entering the United States.
See Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1556 (2010)
(discussing these provisions of the PATRIOT and REAL ID Acts).
70 413 U.S. 123, 129 (1973).
71 Id. at 125.
72 Id. at 127.
73 558 U.S. 310, 350 (2010).
74 Id. at 362.
75 Bluman v. FEC, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012), aff ’g 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding
the ban because of the Court’s long-held exclusion of “foreign citizens from activities that are part
of democratic self-government in the United States”).
76 561 U.S. 1, 7-10 (2010).
68
69
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on the national origin of the receivers.77 Implicitly, this permitted the Court
to discriminate based on nationality because the “terrorist group” was
associated with foreign citizens, which therefore allowed discrimination
based on non-American nationality. Because of this line of reasoning, the
underlying reasoning of discriminating based on national origin has not
explicitly been tested in front of the Court.
D. The Role of the Internet
The Court has treated online speech as an important part of public
discourse, though it is still in the process of mapping public discourse to
cyberspace, leading to different and unique approaches regarding online
speech. This mapping is complicated because online speech does not adhere
to distinctions based on geography and nationality, and so it is hard to
determine who receives First Amendment protections. Even so, in the
Court’s initial interaction with the Internet in Reno v. ACLU, it ruled that
speech on the Internet is entitled to the highest level of First Amendment
protection, similar to protections provided to print media.78
Since Reno, the Court has maintained a high level of protection for online
speech, and has approached its regulation cautiously. In Packingham v. North
Carolina, the Court addressed a North Carolina law that prohibited sex
offenders from creating social media profiles.79 While the Court only applied
intermediate scrutiny to the statute, it also noted that the Internet is a
“modern public square” for “speaking and listening,” and that preventing sex
offenders from using social media altogether prevents them from engaging in
their First Amendment rights.80 More recently, the Court punted on the
question of whether government officials’ social media accounts are considered
public forums.81 Taken together, these cases indicate that First Amendment
principles apply to online speech, though the Court may slowly be trying to
shoehorn traditional First Amendment principles, like the idea of a public
forum, into the unique dimensions of cyberspace.82
Id. at 26-30.
521 U.S. 844, 863, 880, 893 (1997).
137 S. Ct. 1730, 1734 (2017).
Id. at 1737.
Biden v. Knight First Amend. Inst., 141 S. Ct. 1220, 1221, 1227 (2021) (“The extent to which
[Twitter’s power to cut off users’ from its website] matters for purposes of the First Amendment
and the extent to which that power could lawfully be modified raise interesting and important
questions. This petition, unfortunately, affords us no opportunity to confront them.”).
82 The Court also considered whether public school officials can regulate off-campus student
speech expressed online in Mahanoy Area High School v. B.L., finding that the school’s interest in
77
78
79
80
81
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Because only a handful of cases address First Amendment rights online,
recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence helps inform what principles might
arise from the Roberts court regarding technology. Two cases indicate the
Court’s reluctance to allow significant encroachment into Fourth Amendment
rights by the government. In Riley v. California, the Court declined to extend
warrantless searches of arrestees by the police to cell phone searches.83
Astutely, the Court noted that “[c]ell phones differ in both a quantitative and
a qualitative sense from other objects,” and that the quantity and type of
information stored on a cell phone would be too revealing.84 Then, in
Carpenter v. United States, the Court created a new line of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence by limiting the government’s warrantless access to cell site
location information (CSLI) collected by a third party (the cell service
provider).85 The Court reasoned that because cell phones are “such a
pervasive and insistent part of daily life,” there were no good analogies to the
revealing nature of CSLI, so existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
based on third-party doctrine was inadequate.86
These novel First and Fourth Amendment cases provide two takeaways.
First, the Court is aware of the unique nature of online activity and speech,
and is reluctant to allow the government to broadly encroach on rights
through technology. Second, extant case law and analogies might not neatly
map on to these new innovations. Where the Court attempts to fit the square
shape of the Internet into the round hole of old reasoning, it does so in a
rights-protective manner, like in Packingham. But complexities arise when the
Court’s cautious technology jurisprudence clashes with its deferential
approach to the government’s regulation of foreign speakers and speech,
impacting the right to receive in practice.

preventing the use of vulgar language to criticize the school’s cheerleading team did not overcome
the student’s First Amendment rights to free expression. 141. S. Ct. 2038, 2047-48 (2021). In making
this ruling, the Court focused on the nature of in loco parentis, the student’s interests, and the school’s
interests, rather than on the fact that the speech was online. Id. at 2046. Even so, these First
Amendment principles have significant implications for students’ online speech, regardless of
whether the Court focused on that aspect of the speech.
83 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
84 Id. at 393-95.
85 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
86 Id. at 2219-20 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)). The existing third-party
doctrine permitted the government to collect information that was given by a surveillance subject
to a third party (such as checks given to a bank), without having to get a warrant. Id.
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II. THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION IN PRACTICE
Although the right to receive information is an established right, in
practice, other rights, policies, and jurisprudence take precedence. There are
three ways in which the right to receive information from foreign speakers is
not realized, especially online. First, foreign nationals are prosecuted for their
speech, and using the right to receive often fails as a defense due to procedural
and standing issues, or due to deference to Executive authority at the border.
Second, technology companies that cooperate with the government impact
the right to receive, though regulations that prevent transparency make this
hard to verify. Finally, foreign policy decisions more broadly impinge upon
the right to receive. These three avenues mean that in practice, listeners don’t
know what information they’re not seeing. They are aware of the existence of the
tip of the iceberg, but nothing more: they do not know what they do not know. And
if that is the case, then the right to receive information is not really being realized.
A. Failure to Raise the Right to Receive in Court Due to Procedural/Standing
Issues and Executive Authority
As social media and the Internet has proliferated in the post-9/11 era, so
have difficult issues of foreigners exercising their speech online. In multiple
cases, foreigners alleged to have endorsed terrorist activities have been
prosecuted, which impacts Americans’ right to receive. But a right to receive
defense has often not worked. The speaker whose speech is being chilled
cannot raise a right to receive claim. And the listener does not know what
they are missing. The right to receive exists in the air, but neither speaker nor
listener can catch it.
In United States v. Al Bahlul, a military court considered the conviction
and Guantanamo Bay imprisonment of a Yemini al Qaeda officer in charge of
the organization’s public relations.87 Al Bahlul’s work included publicizing al
Qaeda’s bombings and creating propaganda videos.88 Al Bahlul argued that
his prosecution chilled Americans’ “exercise of the right to dissemination of
information.”89 But the Court countered that U.S. citizens could receive such
information through other means, including online, and so their right to
receive was not impacted by his prosecution.90 The D.C. Circuit affirmed
after rehearing en banc, noting that “no governing precedent extends First
87 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1159 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2011), aff ’d sub nom. Bahlul v. United States,
840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
88 Id. at 1161.
89 Id. at 1250.
90 Id.
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Amendment protection to speech undertaken by non-citizens on foreign soil,”
though this was in response to Al Bahlul’s argument that he was exercising his
First Amendment rights,91 rather than his argument about Americans’ right
to receive his speech. Effectively, the Court dismissed Al Bahlul’s First
Amendment claim because Al Bahlul did not have First Amendment rights,
indicating that foreign speakers lack standing to bring First Amendment
claims in the first place.
Additionally, the concerns raised in Mandel that allowed the government
to prohibit foreign speakers from entering the country are also seen in
immigration cases, where courts have upheld denials of visas to foreign
speakers, rejecting right to receive claims by American citizens. In American
Academy of Religion v. Chertoff, appellant (an American organization) raised a
First Amendment right to receive claim when the government denied a visa
to an Islamic scholar.92 The district court found that the government’s denial
rested on the “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” that the appellant
donated to a charity which in turn provided material support to a terrorist
organization.93 Further, the Court has ruled that the Executive can deport
non-citizens if the Executive believes the person is a member of a terrorismsupporting organization (without having to substantiate those claims),
regardless of any chilling effect to First Amendment rights.94 Procedurally, this
stacks the cards against the non-citizens, harming Americans’ right to receive.
Looking beyond the few First Amendment and right to receive cases, Fourth
Amendment cases again provide direction. In United States v. Ramsey, the
Supreme Court considered whether customs officials could open international
mail at the border without probable cause or a warrant.95 Because the search was
made “at the border,” the Court found that Fourth Amendment warrant
provisions did not apply and instead “different considerations” applied.96 The
Court also dismissed any First Amendment considerations that such actions
might chill speech as “minimal” and “wholly subjective.”97 Here too, we see that
different constitutional rules apply at the border, where rights may be suspended
in deference of national security issues and Executive authority.
91 Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757, 796-97 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc), aff ’g United States
v. Al Bahlul, 820, F. Supp. 2d 1141 (Ct. Mil. Comm’n Rev. 2011).
92 06 CV 588, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93424, at *36-37 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2007) (noting that
the “right to hear”—such as plaintiffs’ right to meet “face to face” with the visa applicant—is
trumped by Executive power to make visa decisions).
93 Id. at *54.
94 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488-92 (1999).
95 431 U.S. 606, 607-08 (1977).
96 Id. at 619 (quoting United States v. 12 200-ft Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973)).
97 Id. at 624 (citations omitted).
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In these cases, procedural/standing and border issues complicate the
realization of the right to receive in practice. But unsuccessful litigation is
only a fraction of why the right to receive is in practice not realized.
B. Technology Companies Cooperating with the Government
The government uses myriad policies to pressure technology companies
to share information and take down content; these companies voluntarily
share information about their compliance with the government.98 Despite the
honor system-like method of reporting—a system that is opaque by design—
the data show clear examples of government pressure that impacts the right
to receive information from foreign and domestic speakers. Such pressure is
applied through requests to websites to take down content (content
takedowns), requests to disclose the identity of an accountholder in cases of
a physical emergency (emergency disclosure requests), requests to preserve
data that could be deleted (data/content preservation requests), Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act requests (FISA content requests)99 to preserve
content posted online, and National Security Letters (NSLs) that request
limited information about a user’s identity.
These policies can be sorted into two groups. First, requests that directly
remove content, obviously impacting the right to receive—like content
takedowns. Second, policies that chill speech because content or user identity
is directly reported to the government—such as emergency disclosure
requests, content preservation requests, FISA requests, and NSLs. By
providing access to user information or allowing the government to collect
and preserve a speaker’s speech, technology companies act as enforcers of
government surveillance. Such surveillance chills speech by distorting what
speakers say so that it conforms to majority behavior, creates self-censorship,

98 See, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Tech Companies Are Quietly Phasing Out a Major Privacy Safeguard,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 29, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/09/what-happenedtransparency-reports/599035 [https://perma.cc/F9PJ-93Y8] (describing the voluntary nature of
technology transparency reporting).
99 Note that FISA requests can be directed at content and non-content information. See, e.g., LIZ
WOOLERY, RYAN BUDISH & KEVIN BANKSTON, THE TRANSPARENCY REPORTING TOOLKIT 35-37, 40,
BERKMAN CTR. (Mar. 2016), https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.harvard.edu/files/Final_Transparency.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PY5D-R2QM] (explaining how companies provide content and non-content information
when responding to FISA requests). For the limited scope of this Comment, I will focus on content
requests, since those requests directly target the essence of speech, whereas non-content information
may include metadata and other identifying information that is tangential to the topic of this
Comment.
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and weakens minority opinions.100 Both categories of policies leave American
listeners unable to access speech that was previously said but later taken down, or
more insidiously, speech that foreigners may have wanted to create, but instead selfcensored because they were chilled by the government’s extralegal surveillance.
Even more troubling is that because of regulations regarding wiretaps,
NSL disclosure, and what data and notice can be provided by the receiving
technology firm to a user, it is hard to precisely pinpoint what kind of content
was removed, and what kind of users are being tracked.101 Nonetheless, there
is evidence that content has been taken down and users have been prevented
from posting on popular social media websites, summarized in Table 1 infra.102
For example, Facebook103 restricted thirty-nine pieces of content in 2020.104
It also deactivated accounts after law enforcement requested it do so, though
Facebook does not report how many such accounts are deactivated, or the
deactivated users’ locations.105 And because we don’t know what that content
100 See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment
Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 RICH. L. REV. 465, 483-93 (2015) (describing
how surveillance undermines primary tenets of the First Amendment).
101 See Reuters Staff, Web Companies Give First Look at Secret U.S. Government Data Requests, REUTERS
(Feb. 3, 2014, 3:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/internet-nsa/web-companies-give-first-look-atsecret-u-s-government-data-requests-idUKL2N0L81E320140203 [https://perma.cc/4RB4-GQUD].
102 See infra Table 1.
103 Note that Facebook rebranded its organization to Meta. Introducing Meta: A Social Technology
Company, META, (Oct. 28, 2021) https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/facebook-company-is-now-meta
[https://perma.cc/48BZ-7KG5]. However, this Comment addresses the Facebook platform, and so will
continue to refer to the platform as Facebook, rather than by its parent company’s name.
104 Content
Restrictions
Based
on
Local
Law:
United
States,
FACEBOOK,
https://transparency.fb.com/data/content-restrictions/country/US [https://perma.cc/DQ4V-CEER].
105 Dustin Volz, Rights Groups Ask Facebook to Clarify Policies on Content Removal, REUTERS
(Oct. 31, 2016, 11:01 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-content-groups/rightsgroups-ask-facebook-to-clarify-policies-on-content-removal-idUSKBN12V1ND
[https://perma.cc/9JY7-54TW] (“Facebook deactivated [a U.S. activist’s] account after Baltimore
police issued an emergency request to the company . . . .”).
More recently, the Facebook Files have revealed that Facebook’s internal policies provide
preferential treatment to high-profile users, including not suspending their posts or taking them
down even if such users violated Facebook’s content policies. Jeff Horwitz et al., The Facebook Files,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-facebook-files-11631713039
[https://perma.cc/97E3-H6DD]; Jeff Horwitz, Facebook Says Its Rules Apply to All. Company Documents
Reveal a Secret Elite That’s Exempt, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2021, 10:21 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-files-xcheck-zuckerberg-elite-rules-11631541353?mod=article_inline
[https://perma.cc/F9A4-M3GD]. In addition, the Files show that Facebook attempted to suppress
harmful political movements on its platform and collaborated with the Vietnamese government in
censoring political content. Id.; see also Justin Scheck, Newley Purnell & Jeff Horwitz, Facebook
Employees Flag Drug Cartels and Human Traffickers. The Company’s Response Is Weak, Documents Show,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2021, 1:24 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-drug-cartels-humantraffickers-response-is-weak-documents-11631812953?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/B6DKTZZY] (noting the extent of foreign government collaboration with Facebook, such as the
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entailed and who those accountholders are, we don’t know whether the chilled
or removed speech was significant, meaningful, or genuinely dangerous.
Google has more granular data about removal requests. Around thirtyfive pieces of content were taken down in 2020 for “privacy and security”
reasons, and more than forty-two pieces were requested to be removed by
government officials.106 However, sorted by reason, few requests are given the
direct motive of “national security,” though there are also some requests from
the military.107 Other notable companies include Apple, which received
thirty-four account deletion requests,108 Twitter, which received 358 noncourt ordered legal demands and complied with 146 of them, 109 and Reddit,
which had three requests from the U.S. government, all in 2020.110
There are two caveats to these data. First, while websites report the types
of requests being processed, they are under no obligation to do so, and their
transparency requests are not audited.111 Further, the format of the
transparency reports differ,112 and it is unclear whether the companies use the
same methodology to report government requests. Even with a deep
investigation of these transparency reports, it is unclear how clean and
consistent the data is both within each company, and across companies.
Second, with respect to content takedowns, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint
Vietnamese government and military’s “organized efforts” to systemically harass a political opponent
and restrict the opponent’s social media reach). While none of these acts were, prima facie, at the
behest of the U.S. government, the Facebook Files do indicate the lack of transparency around how
Facebook’s user policies are implemented, how it interacts with government operators, and how clear
it is whether content takedown is done unilaterally or in collaboration or coordination with any
government. Id.
106 Google Transparency Reports By Country/Region: Government Requests to Remove Content, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/government-removals/by-country?hl=en [https://perma.cc/KQZ3CFBJ] (click the tab that says “Government Requests,” click on “select countries/regions,” choose “United
States” and filter by reasons (for “privacy and security”) or by requesters (for police and other government
officials) under the ‘Items’ graph, and select the appropriate date range).
107 Id.
108 Apple Transparency Report: United States, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/us.html
[https://perma.cc/3Y4G-UBKE] (select Date Ranges for both halves of 2020 and look at the “Accounts
Specified in the Requests” category under “Account Restriction / Account Deletion”).
109 Twitter
Transparency Report: United States, TWITTER (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://transparency.twitter.com/en/reports/countries/us.html#2020-jan-jun [https://perma.cc/S8R8-HVFT]
(see “Removal Requests”). Note that unlike Facebook and Google, Twitter did not distinguish how many
requests were copyright-related.
110 Reddit Transparency Report 2020, REDDIT (2020), https://www.redditinc.com/policies/transparencyreport-2020-1 [https://perma.cc/8BP6-XKW3].
111 See supra note 98.
112 This also makes it incredibly difficult to compile data like that in Table 1, which further
obscures the extent of these companies’ cooperation in making disclosures and makes it harder to
assess First Amendment impacts.
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whether a user is foreign or content is posted by a foreign user, due to the mechanics
of the Internet. For example, even if a user’s profile indicates that they live in Delhi,
they may currently be located within the United States. A user’s Internet Protocol
(IP) address—a digital address temporarily attached to their device—could help to
identify their location.113 Even so, IP addresses at best provide approximate
positions.114 Further, technologies such as Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)115 and
software like Tor116 can obscure an individual’s location entirely. Simply put, when
a website like Facebook takes down content posted by a user or deactivates a user’s
account, it is difficult to know whether that user was a foreigner. Nonetheless, given
the size and geographic scope of these websites’ user bases, it is likely that some
foreigners’ content or accounts have been taken down.
The data from the five companies is summarized in Table 1 below. Outside
of content takedown requests, of note are the sheer number of content
preservation requests that are made to Facebook and Google. Specifically, the
government made 122,790 total requests (and each request may contain
information about multiple pieces of data or users) in 2020 from up to 208,385
accounts on Facebook, which in absolute numbers is a lot of chilled speech or
users.117 Similarly, the government has made FISA content requests that
impact more than 122,000 Facebook users in 2020,118 more than 73,000 Google
users in the first half of 2020,119 and nearly 45,000 Apple users in 2020.120 And
finally, the government has made a total of around 15,000 emergency disclosure

113 Aaron Mackey, Seth Schoen & Cindy Cohn, Unreliable Informants: IP Addresses, Digital Tips and
Police Raids, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sep. 2016), https://www.eff.org/files/2016/09/22/2016.09.20_final
_formatted_ip_address_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEJ9-8XBL] (“IP address information, by
itself, serves as an inconsistent tool . . . to identify an exact location.”).
114 Id. (“IP address information, by itself, serves as an inconsistent tool . . . to identify an
exact location.”).
115 See, e.g., Zhensheng Zhang, Ya-Qin Zhang, Xiaowen Chu & Bo Li, An Overview of Virtual
Private Network (VPN): IP VPN and Optical VPN, 7 PHOTONIC NETWORK COMMC’NS 213, 214-15
(2004) (describing the mechanics of a VPN).
116 See, e.g., Seongmin Kim, Juhyeng Han, Jaehyeong Ha, Taesoo Kim & Dongsu Han, SGXTor: A Secure and Practical Tor Anonymity Network With SGX Enclaves, 26 IEEE/ACM
TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING 2174, 2174 (2018) (describing how Tor works).
117 Transparency Report: Government Requests for User Data (United States), FACEBOOK,
https://transparency.fb.com/data/government-data-requests/country/US [https://perma.cc/SM57-M5F5].
Note that the total number of accounts may be less than 208,385, since the accounts over each half-yearly
period may overlap.
118 Id. (see “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act”).
119 Google Transparency Report: United States National Security Requests for User Information, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/us-national-security?hl=en [https://perma.cc/JF8G9W9A]. As of the time of writing, data for the second half of 2020 was unavailable.
120 Apple Transparency Report: United States, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/us.html
[https://perma.cc/3Y4G-UBKE] (see “National Security – FISA Content Requests” category).
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requests and sent up to 2,500 NSLs towards the five websites.121 While these
numbers are small compared to the user bases of each of these platforms, speech is
not chilled by the actual number of government requests, but by the perception of
the depth of government reach and the fear of future prosecution.122
Put simply, the government’s takedown of content, deletion of accounts, and
chilling of speech through various opaque methods impact the right to receive. But
these numbers barely scratch the surface, since there are myriad indirect and arcane
ways in which the government could pressure technology companies to moderate
their content.123 Even so, the numbers indicate that U.S. users’ right to receive
information from domestic and foreign speakers is being impacted by the
government’s interaction with technology companies.
But numbers don’t tell us exactly how much impact the government’s acts create.
This government-website cooperation functions in kind, though not in magnitude,
like the Great Firewall of China:124 the government can decide what speech is “too
harmful” or “too disruptive” for American viewers to experience. And it can
monitor those whose speech may be harmful, causing subjects of that surveillance
to silence themselves when they would not otherwise. For example, American
listeners will never know whether blocked and unsaid speech was terrorist
propaganda, or advocacy for the Boycott Divest Sanction (BDS) movement against
Israel.125 This is especially so because the government can pressure technology
companies to undermine civil liberties, and then escape scrutinizing litigation,
effectively in an end-run around the Constitution.126 These factors create an
unknown unknown that is likely to get larger as cyberspace becomes the new terrain
for propaganda and election interference.
See infra table 1.
See, e.g., Jonathon W. Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 117, 164 (2016) (noting that where users know about government surveillance,
they censor themselves “out of concern for potential future harms,” and that knowledge of
government monitoring, rather than actually being monitored, chills speech).
123 See, e.g., Craig Timberg, How Conservatives Learned to Wield Power Inside Facebook, WASH. POST
(Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/20/facebook-republican-shift
[https://perma.cc/F2A7-3P53] (“[Republicans] have pressured Facebook by making unproven claims of bias
against conservatives amid rising signs of government action on the issue, including investigations by
Congress and the Justice Department.”).
124 See generally, Xueyang Xu, Z. Morley Mao & J. Alex Halderman, Internet Censorship in China, in 6579
LECTURE NOTES IN COMP. SCI. 133, 133 (2011) (describing the Great Firewall of China’s mechanisms).
125 See, e.g., Ark. Times LP. v. Waldrip, 988 F.3d 453, 458-59 (8th Cir. 2020) (addressing an
Arkansas law that penalizes government contractors who support BDS).
126 See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1290
(2020) (“[A]lgorithmic governance amplifies some recurring problems for procedural due process.”);
Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of
the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 14 (2006) (“[G]overnments have sought to enlist private actors . . .
as proxy censors to control the flow of information.”).
121
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Table 1: Content Takedowns and Chilled Speech Across
Technology Platforms127

A complete table with sources can be found at the end of this piece, infra Table 1-A: Content
Takedowns and Chilled Speech Across Technology Platforms (with endnote citations).
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C. Foreign Policy and Executive Authority
A final way the government impacts Americans’ right to receive is through
foreign policy and Executive actions. Such actions illustrate the practical
weakness of the right to receive, revealing that the Executive’s authority over
foreign policy gives it power to silence foreign speakers, especially in
cyberspace. This Section will cover three categories of such actions:
government pressure on technology companies to remove accounts of foreign
leaders and extremist figures; sanctions and actions against foreign
technology platforms like TikTok; and wartime acts.
Leaders of many nations and groups, not just current U.S. presidents,
have social media accounts. Along with the rise in extremism and terrorism,
the U.S. government has sought to stem the support that some leaders have
on social media by pressuring technology companies to ban “blacklisted”
individuals who are on watchlists.128 In addition, prominent lawmakers have
suggested that social media platforms that host leaders of countries
sanctioned by the United States might be violating those sanctions,129 and
have proposed legislation that would “sanction the ‘provision of services,’
including the provision and maintenance of . . . social media [accounts] to
foreign individuals or entities sanctioned for terrorism, and senior officials of
state sponsors of terrorism.”130 At minimum, this has a chilling effect on how
such foreign speakers use technology to convey their speech, and could lead
them to self-censor.
In addition, the government’s explicit actions regarding foreign
technology platforms also directly impact a right to receive. Through
Executive Orders, President Trump sought to prevent further downloads of
the Chinese language messaging app WeChat131 and the video/social media
platform TikTok.132 WeChat is the primary messaging app for Chinesespeaking Americans and especially those who are trying to communicate with
128 Sheren Khalel, US Terror Sanctions: Do Social Media Companies Have to Comply?, MIDDLE EAST
EYE (May 6, 2019, 6:48 PM), https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hold-social-media-platforms-navigateus-blacklists-under-murky-censorship-requirements [https://perma.cc/FJ4Q-3HDK].
129 See, e.g., Peter Harrell & Elizabeth Goiten, How Iran Became the New Battle Line Between
Conservatives and Twitter, POLITICO (June 16, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/202
0/06/16/how-iran-became-the-new-battle-line-between-conservatives-and-twitter-320615
[https://perma.cc/XYZ9-GRGP] (describing Ted Cruz’s argument that Twitter’s hosting of Iranian
leaders’ accounts violates sanctions against Iran).
130 Brooke Singman, ‘No Social Media Accounts for Terrorists’: House GOP Pushes to Block Sanctioned
Foreign Leaders from Platforms, FOX NEWS (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/goplawmakers-push-no-social-media-accounts-for-terrorists-bill [https://perma.cc/78AP-FMJW].
131 Exec. Order No. 13,943, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 2020).
132 Exec. Order No. 13,942, 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (Aug. 6, 2020).
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China-based users.133 Banning the app impacts American users’ right to
receive information from their Chinese counterparts. Although the Chinese
government censors messages on WeChat,134 the U.S. government’s ban—
currently tied up in the courts135—of all messages through an app looks like
the statute used in Lamont to prevent Americans from receiving communist
propaganda. Similarly, banning TikTok, which has a global user base, directly
impacts Americans’ right to receive information from foreign users, including
potential (subjectively defined) propaganda or foreign influence.136 The
President enacted these bans through the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA), which allows them to “block and prohibit all
transactions in all property and interests in property” against those engaging
in economic or industrial espionage of American intellectual property, if such
transactions impacts national security.137 This broad grant of power sets up a
clash between national security authority and the right to receive.
Finally, the government’s previous wartime acts indicate that the right to
receive may take a back seat to national security.138 Since the threat of
133 U.S. WeChat Users All. v. Trump, 488 F. Supp. 3d 912 ,927 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“WeChat is
effectively the only means of communication for many in the [Chinese-American] community, not
only because China bans other apps, but also because Chinese speakers with limited English
proficiency have no options other than WeChat.”).
134 Eileen Guo, Censored by China, Under Attack in America: What’s Next for WeChat?, MIT
TECH. REV. (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/10/30/1011450/wechatcensored-china-under-attack-in-america [https://perma.cc/8Q6R-7D4S] (“American WeChat users
aren’t necessarily subject to the same levels of Chinese Internet policing . . . [but] most content is
still subject to the [government’s] rules.”). The article also notes that and that Chinese operatives
may be using WeChat to influence foreigners. Id.
135 U.S. WeChat Users All., 488 F. Supp. 3d at 912.
136 Drew Harwell & Tony Romm, Inside TikTok: A Culture Clash Where U.S. Views About
Censorship Often Were Overridden by the Chinese Bosses, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/11/05/inside-tiktok-culture-clash-where-us-viewsabout-censorship-often-were-overridden-by-chinese-bosses [https://perma.cc/ADD2-YZXT] (“[F]ormer
employees claimed attempts to persuade Chinese teams not to block or penalize certain videos were
routinely ignored, out of caution about the Chinese government[] . . . .”). See also Planet Money,
Nervous TikTok, NPR (Jan. 13, 2021, 10:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/956558906
[https://perma.cc/6BSH-SXZN] (discussing propaganda and censorship on TikTok).
137 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a), 1708(b).
138 The current First Amendment jurisprudence protecting speech rights (except for inciting
speech) only goes back to the 1960s, when Brandenburg v. Ohio was decided. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
Prior to that, “[t]he U.S. government prosecuted Nazi sympathizers during World War II, draft
protesters during World War I, and Southern sympathizers in the Union during the Civil War.” Eric
Posner, ISIS Gives Us No Choice but to Consider Limits on Speech, SLATE (Dec. 15, 2015, 5:37 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/12/isiss-online-radicalization-efforts-present-anunprecedented-danger.html [https://perma.cc/524C-6RUS]. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 51-52 (1919) (upholding convictions for distributing anti-draft leaflets as not violative of the
First Amendment).
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terrorism has created a perpetual state of war,139 current policy indicates that
the right to receive is being suppressed. Two examples stand out. First, the
material support to terrorism statute140 allows for the possibility that
technology companies may be subject to federal criminal prosecution for
providing terrorists a platform.141 At minimum, indirectly, it prevents certain
non-profits from providing resources to some foreign organizations,
including presumably their media presence, if those groups are labelled
terrorist organizations.142 Second, the threat of terrorism has been used to
justify the collection of visa applicants’ social media handles, which has the
potential to chill candid speech online for fear of having visas denied.143
While visa applicants themselves do not have First Amendment rights,
Americans have the right to receive their speech.
Together, these examples of the failure to uphold the right to receive in
courts, the government’s pressure on technology companies to take down
content or chill speech through monitoring, and the Executive’s foreign policy
decisions regarding extremism online indicate that the right to receive differs
in theory and in practice. But the story gets worse. If a plaintiff wanted to
bring a claim against the government for affecting a U.S. user’s ability to
receive foreign speech, that claim would almost certainly fail in court.

139 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)
(authorizing the use of armed forced to “prevent any future acts of international terrorism . . . .”
without providing any definitive end date to the usage).
140 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
141 Rachel E. VanLandingham, Jailing the Twitter Bird: Social Media, Material Support to
Terrorism, and Muzzling the Modern Press, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 5-7 (2017). But see Force v.
Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding that § 230 of the Communications Decency
Act bars liability under the material support statute).
142 See Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2010) (upholding the material
support statute that prevented petitioners from providing political advocacy and legal training to
the Kurdistan Worker’s Party and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam).
143 US Demands Social Media Details from Visa Applicants, BBC (June 1, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-48486672 [https://perma.cc/99ZB-B7WM]. See also
Faiza Patel, Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Raya Koreh & Sophia DenUyl, Social Media Monitoring:
How the Department of Homeland Security Uses Digital Data in the Name of National Security,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/socialmedia-monitoring [https://perma.cc/73KZ-WZ5L] (Mar. 11, 2020) (detailing the immense
Department of Homeland Security data collection operation that surveils immigrants and visa
applicants, and conclusively chills speech).
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III. THE DIFFICULTIES OF BRINGING A RIGHT TO RECEIVE
INFORMATION CLAIM IN COURT
The problem with the right to receive foreign speech runs deeper than
practice diverging from doctrine. While there are significant benefits to
receiving foreign speech, there are hurdles to successful litigation. Plaintiffs
will have to contend with attaining standing, which is difficult. The
government could then claim national security authority or raise incitement
doctrine to defeat the claim. And there are practical considerations around
the mechanics of the Internet that would weaken litigation.
A. Standing is Difficult to Attain
The issue of standing in electronics communications cases, especially
pertaining to the First Amendment, leaves little in favor of potential
plaintiffs. Claims must be concrete and nonspeculative. Instances where the
government pressures technology platforms to remove posts or chill speech
are difficult to bring precisely because plaintiffs do not know what speech is
being stifled—or even that it is being stifled—and thus lack sufficient factual
bases to satisfy the Twombly and Iqbal standard. Further, foreigners outside
the United States cannot bring claims, and instead, U.S. persons must bring
them to proceed in litigation. This leaves a chicken-and-egg issue implicating
third-party standing, which is difficult to attain.
In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Court considered whether
Amnesty had standing to challenge the government’s warrantless surveillance
of alleged agents of foreign powers under section 702 of FISA.144 Amnesty
claimed that there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood that their
communications will be acquired,” chilling their speech.145 But the Court
ruled in favor of the government, noting that “allegations of a subjective ‘chill’
are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific” harm.146 Instead, to
establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must show the injury to be “concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent [and] fairly traceable to the challenged
action.”147 The injury must also be “‘certainly impending’ . . . allegations of
possible future injury are not sufficient.”148
Clapper’s scope and its narrowing effect on cases satisfying Article III
standing are especially impactful on right to receive cases. Claims where the
144
145
146
147
148

568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
Id. at 407.
Id. at 418 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972)).
Id. at 409.
Id.
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government’s monitoring of technology platforms have chilled speech are not
the “objective harm” the Court envisioned and are likely to be considered
speculative, because the lack of transparency between technology companies’
interaction with the government makes it nearly impossible to concretely and
particularly show that the government’s actions chill speech. Indeed, appellate
courts have found that First Amendment claims where third parties (who can
be foreign speakers)149 are involved or where the government creates
inestimable or unlikely risks150 are too speculative for chilled speech claims.
In contrast, examples where chilled speech claims survive standing are direct
threats of intimidation to quell speech,151 government targeting based on
speech,152 and reputational injury153—none of which resemble the issue here.
Even if a chilled speech claim (which implicitly affects the right to receive
information, since the speaker will be chilled from speaking, and thus the
receiver will not receive the information that may have been said) could
withstand the threshold for standing, finding the right plaintiff is difficult. If
located in the United States, a foreigner whose speech is chilled could bring
a claim on behalf of third parties whose right to receive is affected. But two
issues arise: first, courts generally frown upon third-party standing,154 and
cases where third-party standing is likely to succeed generally have to do with
Zimmerman v. City of Austin, 881 F.3d 378, 390 (5th Cir. 2018).
See, e.g., Munns v. Kerry, 782 F.3d 402, 410-11 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff ’s challenge
to the government’s policy that forbids negotiating with terrorists for the release of hostages).
Plaintiff ’s argument was that such a policy deterred him from seeking employment as a contractor
in Iraq, and would violate his family members’ ability to seek his release if plaintiff was captured as
a hostage. The Court noted that “even if [plaintiff ’s] plans to return to Iraq were sufficiently
concrete, his likelihood of being kidnapped would still be speculative . . . . The chain of events
leading to injury from these policies is simply too hypothetical and attenuated to constitute injury
in fact.” Id.
151 See, e.g., Speech First, Inc. v. Schlissel, 939 F.3d 756, 765 (6th Cir. 2019) (finding standing
where the defendant, on behalf of the University of Michigan, used the “implicit threat of punishment
and intimidation to quell speech”).
152 See, e.g., Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 827-28 (9th Cir. 2020)
(obtaining standing where the primary motivating factor for a government agency’s potentially
unlawful behavior was the “plaintiff ’s exercise of their First Amendment rights.”).
153 See, e.g., Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 801 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Specifically, where
claims of a chilling effect are accompanied by concrete allegations of reputational harm, the plaintiff
has shown injury in fact.”).
154 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (“[T]he plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”).
However, if a law or policy is “substantially overbroad,” then third-party standing for First
Amendment claims exists. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853,
863, 867-68 (1991). But there is no singular overbroad government policy suppressing foreign speech.
Instead, content removal and chilled speech happens ad hoc, as noted in earlier Sections.
149
150
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associational standing155 or organizational standing,156 which are not satisfied
here. Second, it is unclear whether foreigners could bring any First
Amendment claim in U.S. courts, and courts avoid the issue.157
On the other hand, Americans whose right to receive is impacted by
speech they have yet to hear could bring a claim on their own behalf—an
ouroboros if ever there were one. Of course, American plaintiffs might have
an easier time in courts, since plaintiffs who demonstrate self-censorship or
that they have foregone electronic communication, as in Wikimedia
Foundation v. National Security Agency/Central Security Service, have
standing.158 But while American plaintiffs have an easier time establishing
standing, they would still have to find out that they were tangibly not
receiving speech from foreign speakers the government does not want them
to hear from. The unknown unknown provides a blind spot, preventing those
with the ability to bring claims in court from doing so.
B. National Security and Executive Authority Are Given Immense Deference
Even if the right plaintiff could attain standing and show concrete harm,
courts’ deference to national security issues complicates the picture. Statutes
impacting citizens’ speech have been upheld in courts, indicating deference
to Congress and the Executive. Courts also give wide latitude to the other
branches in national security-related cases, especially regarding terrorism.
Finally, the forum itself might be biased, since such cases might end up in
Foreign Intelligence Service Courts (FISCs), or might uphold the
government’s right to interfere in national security issues.
We need not look far to see that courts rarely strike down statutes that
sacrifice First Amendment rights in the face of national security, especially
during wartime. The Court has upheld statutes that prevented the

155 See, e.g., United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544,
557 (1996) (noting that associational standing, which is sufficient to rebut the presumption “that litigants
may not assert the rights of absent third parties” can only be applied in “particular relationships.”).
156 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (“[A]n organization whose
members are injured may represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review.”).
157 See Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 194 n.140 (2d Cir. 2013). Note that the Court did not
reach whether non-citizen plaintiffs could assert First Amendment rights; see also United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1990) (discussing that the Framers likely intended the
phrase “the people” in the Fourth Amendment, as well as the First Amendment, to apply to “a class
of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient
connection with this country to be considered part of that community.” In the context of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court notes that its purpose was to protect “the people of the United States.”).
158 857 F.3d 193, 211 (4th Cir. 2017).
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obstruction of military recruitment by distributing leaflets,159 forbade
conspiring to organize as the Communist Party of the United States,160
authorized the deportation of non-citizens for “ill-defined ideological
‘crimes’,”161 and banned burning draft cards.162 Contemporarily, in
Humanitarian Law Project, the Court upheld the material support statute,
which prevents Americans from providing legal training to or advocacy for
foreign organizations denoted as terrorist groups by the Executive branch,
effectively preventing all communications to these off-limits factions.163 But
not being able to communicate with these groups also means Americans cannot
receive information from them. Finally, the Patriot Act chills speech within the
United States and between Americans and foreigners, by expanding law
enforcement agencies’ ability to tap domestic and international phones.164 So
far, it has consistently been renewed and has largely remained intact.165
Courts are also deferential when handling terrorism and national security
cases. In United States v. Mehanna, the First Circuit found that although
Mehanna engaged in the First Amendment activity of translating al Qaeda
propaganda from Arabic to English and posted it online, Mehanna’s travels
abroad and conspiracy to kill foreigners, in combination with his First
Amendment activity, were adequate to convict him of four terrorism related
counts.166 Similarly, in United States v. C.S., the Third Circuit found that a
teenager’s threats made in an “Internet chatroom dedicated to discussing
terroristic attacks,” including making “threats against a local church,” were
adequate for conviction.167 And in Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v.
United States Department of Treasury, the Ninth Circuit ruled that because the
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1919).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951). Note that Dennis is still good law and
has never been overruled. See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, What is War?: Reflections on
Free Speech in “Wartime”, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 833, 851 (2005) (emphasizing that the Court could be
urged to “retreat” to Dennis’ version of the “clear and present danger” test).
161 David Cole, What’s A Metaphor?: The Deportation of a Poet, 1 YALE J.L. & LIBERATION 5, 6 (1989).
162 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
163 Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2010).
164 See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, §§ 201-25,
§§ 501-08, §701, 115 Stat. 272, 278-96, 363-68, 374 (2001).
165 See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth Amendment,
41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 78 (2006) (“United States persons may still be investigated based in
part on First Amendment protected activities . . . .”); Patrick P. Garlinger, Note, Privacy, Free Speech,
and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth Amendment Limits on National Security Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1105, 1110-11, 1118 (2009) (discussing how the Patriot Act expands the FBI’s NSL authority, and how
Congress’s amendments have allowed the act to withstand First Amendment challenges).
166 735 F.3d 32, 41-44, 46 (1st Cir. 2013).
167 968 F.3d 237, 238, 240 (3d Cir. 2020).
159
160
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Islamic Foundation’s foreign owner was designated a global terrorist—a
designation partially based on classified information not presented at trial—
violation of the Islamic Foundation’s due process rights were “harmless.”168
Taken separately, each of these cases may have been decided correctly,
preventing potentially dangerous speech. But taken together, we see that
courts are willing to combine First Amendment activity with circumstantial
evidence to determine that parties are engaging in terrorist activity, even if
not factually true. And these conclusions are based at least in part on whether
the speaker is foreign. Even if some of the speech is concerning, if a critical
reason to convict is the foreignness of the speech, ruling for the government
means a lot of innocent speech is likely to be caught up in such prosecutions.
Beyond terrorism and First Amendment-related cases, the Court has
shown significant deference to Congress and the Executive when dealing with
national security affairs. In Humanitarian Law Project, Chief Justice Roberts
spent many pages quoting Congress’s and the Executive’s findings about
terrorism, stating that
[The] evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’s assessment, is
entitled to deference. This litigation implicates sensitive and weighty
interests of national security . . . . neither the Members of this Court nor
most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe new and
serious threats to our Nation and its people.169

This obeisance rankled three liberal dissenters, led by Justice Breyer, who
noted the need for the judicial branch to analyze the veracity of the claims
made by the government.170 Yet the Court has continued this deference. For
example, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court yielded to Presidential authority to
implement the “Muslim ban,”171 despite strong evidence that the content of the ban
was “significantly affected by religious animus against Muslims,” which would have
violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.172
These cases are but a few of the many examples in which even egregious
violations of constitutional rights are found acceptable because the Court
defers to the other branches in national security and foreign policy matters.
It is unlikely that a violation of the mere right to receive information from
686 F.3d 965, 971, 974-75, 979-81 (9th Cir. 2012).
Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33-34 (2010).
See id. at 54-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But it remains for this Court to decide whether the
Government has shown that such an interest justifies criminalizing speech activity otherwise
protected by the First Amendment.”).
171 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2430 (2018).
172 Id. at 2429, 2430-32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
168
169
170

2022]

Unknown Unknowns

1371

foreign speakers will receive sympathy when far more serious constitutional
violations, such as in the aforementioned cases, have gone uncorrected by the
Court. But even if this were not the case, plaintiffs bringing such right to
receive cases to court face an uphill battle, with systemic advantages for the
government. Since these cases have to do with foreign speakers and national
security, the government may have home court advantage in FISCs, which
are notoriously secretive. Further, the government can intervene in cases that
implicate national security and where the case, or many of its components,
are secret, muddying claims and reducing their chances of success.
FISCs provide an immense home-court advantage.173 In Clapper, the
Court noted that section 702 of FISA was not immune from judicial review,
referring the respondents to the FISC,174 which is a secretive court that
oversees surveillance against foreign threats.175 Because some of the tools that
chill speech—such as NSLs—may be implicated by FISA, American
plaintiffs who claim that their right to receive has been impacted may have to
go to secretive FISCs through amici curiae, since plaintiffs are not allowed to
be direct parties.176 Outside of the FISC, courts in general may also allow the
government to withhold relevant information when the government asserts
state secrets privilege because “there is a reasonable danger that compulsion
of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national
security, should not be divulged.”177 The home court advantage tilts to casinolike levels for the government, because if the suit leads to “the disclosure of
matters which the law itself regards as confidential,” then that suit cannot be

173 Like playing against Rafael Nadal at the French Open. See, e.g., Manoj Bhagavatula, Rafael
Nadal’s 1000 Wins: 100 at French Open, 172 vs Top 10, 86 Titles, ESPN (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.espn.com/tennis/story/_/id/30260238/rafael-nadal-1000-wins-100-french-open-172-vstop-10-86-titles [https://perma.cc/P9RL-3WF6].
174 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 421 (2013).
175 See, e.g., ANDREW NOLAN & RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43362,
REFORM OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURTS: PROCEDURAL AND
OPERATIONAL CHANGES 3-4 (2014) (describing FISC procedures and operations).
176 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective
Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015 (Freedom Act), Pub. L. 114-23, § 401, 129 Stat. 268, 279-81
(2015) (detailing the process of appointing amicus curiae). Note that tools like NSLs are intended
to be secret and come with nondisclosure requirements towards the implementing technology
companies. In re Nat’l Sec. Letter v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, plaintiffs are
also unlikely to know in a timely manner whether their constitutional rights have been impacted.
177 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953). See generally El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F.
Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006) for a contemporary example. There, the government asserted the state
secrets privilege against a claim by an innocent victim of the CIA’s extraordinary rendition program,
preventing the claim from proceeding. Id. at 535.
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maintained at all.178 Since this pro-secrecy approach leads to less accurate
legal outcomes179 and significantly favors the government,180 potential
plaintiffs would still face an uphill battle, if they even got this far.
Thus, the home court advantage for the government is almost
insurmountable. The Court is likely to sacrifice First Amendment rights
during wartime, including during a perpetual war against terrorism.181 It is
likely to defer to the government’s authority and provide evidentiary privilege,
as well as favorable outcomes, in litigation regarding national security.
C. Incitement and True Threats Doctrine Could Take Precedence
Another problem arises with the nature of the speech in question. A
theme of many cases is that a lot of foreign speech the government is
concerned with deals with alleged terrorist or violent activity.182 First
Amendment incitement doctrine provides justifications to prevent or
suppress speech that incites violence, including censorship that might affect
178 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). While this is an old case, the principle is
alive and well. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 563 U.S. 478, 486-87 (2011) (applying
the state secrets doctrine to a contract breach case). Most recently, the Court unanimously upheld
the use of the state secrets doctrine in suppressing evidence and dismissing respondents’ claims that
the FBI violated the Muslim respondents’ First Amendment establishment clause rights by
infiltrating a Muslim community, recording conversations, collecting phone numbers, and
surveilling public discussions. FBI v. Fazaga, 142 S. Ct. 1051 (2022). Similarly, in United States v.
Zubaydah, the Court also used the state secrets doctrine to prevent respondent, a Guantanamo Bay
detainee, from subpoenaing former CIA contractors for information that would confirm the existence
of a detention facility in Poland and substantiate claims that Zubaydah was subject to torture. 142
S. Ct. 959 (2022).
179 See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, The Procedural Exceptionalism of National Security Secrecy, 97
B.U. L. REV. 103, 144-45 (2017) (discussing how procedural exceptionalism prevents courts from
policing national security secrecy, prevents accurate outcomes due to a lack of adversarialism, and
undermines legitimacy of the legal process).
180 An example of how much of a house effect the government has can be seen in how often
the FISC approves applications for electronic surveillance. In 2019, the FISC received 848
applications, but denied just one. STEPHEN E. BOYD, ANNUAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT REPORT TO CONGRESS (2019), https://www.justice.gov/nsd/nsd-foialibrary/2019fisa/download [https://perma.cc/C9Y8-VY98]. This record is even better than Nadal’s at
the French Open.
181 See generally Emily Posner, Note, The War on Speech in the War on Terror: An Examination of
the Espionage Act Applied to Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 717
(2007) (discussing and critiquing how freedom of speech may be constrained during times of war).
182 See Maura Conway, Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six
Suggestions for Progressing Research, 40 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 77, 77 (2017) (“There is
increasing concern on the part of other scholars, and increasingly also policymakers and publics, that
high and increasing levels of always-on Internet access and the production and wide dissemination—
and thence easy availability—of large amounts of violent extremist content online may have violent
radicalizing effects, which certainly appears to be one of the main purposes of its producers.”).
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the right to receive. A few key historical cases indicate the breadth of the
doctrine, but some terrorism cases exemplify that incitement doctrine is too
broadly applied contemporarily: courts do not find violations of the First
Amendment, even when they should.
Brandenburg v. Ohio is the first modern case to refine incitement doctrine.
In overturning the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member who attended a rally
advocating for violence, the Court noted that the government can only
proscribe the advocacy where it is “directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”183
Then, in Hess v. Indiana, the Court noted that such a threat could not be
“advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time.”184 Finally, in
Virginia v. Black, the Court expanded the “true threats” doctrine. Beyond
incitement, the government could also ban “true threats,” which include
speech when there is only intent to commit unlawful violence, even if such
violence is not imminent.185
What we see in contemporary cases is a broader interpretation of these
doctrines which allows the government to proscribe speech, or prosecute
individuals for their incitement or terrorism-related speech, without much
more. For example, in Doe v. McKesson, the Fifth Circuit used a lower
standard for incitement, applying a tort standard in determining that the
respondent’s speech could leave him liable for the petitioner police officer’s
injuries: “Officer Doe simply need[s] to plausibly allege that his injuries were
one of the consequences of tortious activity which itself was authorized, directed, or
ratified by McKesson in violation of his duty of care.”186 A related example of
incitement doctrine gone awry is Perez v. Florida, where Perez was convicted
of threatening acts because he made a (clearly unfunny) joke about having a
Molotov cocktail, despite having no proven intent to create one.187 Courts are
thus allowing the government to proscribe speech even when it proximately
incites violence or remotely indicates intent to do so, which goes beyond what
Brandenburg and Black originally prescribed.

395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973).
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
945 F.3d 818, 829 (5th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted),
(noting that the Fifth Circuit’s decision was based on uncertain readings of state law and that the
constitutional question should be presented to the state courts first), vacated on other grounds,
McKesson v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 48, 51 (2020).
187 137 S. Ct. 853, 853-54 (2017) (Sotomayor, J, concurring in denial of certiorari).
183
184
185
186
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While these are but three examples,188 there is also scholarly support for
reducing the threshold of what constitutes “incitement” and to reduce the
imminence requirement to facilitate prosecuting terrorism-related cases.189 In
fact, the current true threats doctrine itself may be considered as lessening
the protections of the narrow, immediate-effect test of Brandenburg, toward a
test that communicates intent to harm “at some future time.”190 And there are
non-judicial examples of how speech online may be considered threatening
and thus warranting a response from law enforcement.191 Finally, the existence
of the material support statute192 that the Court upheld in Humanitarian Law
Project entirely removes the need for intent in terrorism support cases, creating
a strict liability-type rule for any communication with designated
organizations.193
Thus, the incitement and true threats doctrines as they are currently
applied likely will conflict with the right to receive. The right to receive is a
First Amendment right. But fighting words and true threats are exempt from
First Amendment protections. And considering the nature of the foreign
speech the government is likely to find issue with, in reality the right to
receive information may not be realized because of the holes cut in the First
Amendment fabric. Optimistically, perhaps this tension sets up a clash that
the Court must one day decide: between a right to receive and the expanded
true threats doctrine, which takes precedence? Until the Court deals with the
question, Brandenburg and Black could tear at the threads of the right to receive.

188 See also Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1064-65, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that anti-abortion advocacy
organizations’ use of “Guilty” posters for abortion providers constituted “threats of force.”).
189 See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, Assumptions About “Terrorism” and the Brandenburg Incitement
Test, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 112-14, 127-29 (2019) (describing and critiquing scholastic commentary
urging such a change by Professors Cass Sunstein and Richard Posner, among others).
190 Matthew G. T. Martin, True Threats, Militant Activists, and the First Amendment, 82 N.C. L.
REV. 280, 296 (2003).
191 See, e.g., Jason Leopold, TMZ Emailed the Secret Service About Eminem’s Trump Lyrics. Agents then
Investigated the Rapper, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 24, 2019, 11:49 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
jasonleopold/eminem-secret-service-trump-ivanka-tmz] [https://perma.cc/KQV9-WHSG] (reporting that
Eminem was investigated by the Secret Service after his song “Framed” included the lyrics “Donald Duck’s
on as the Tonka Truck in the yard. But dog, how the fuck is Ivanka Trump in the trunk of my car?”).
192 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2015).
193 See, e.g., Nikolas Abel, United States v. Mehanna, The First Amendment, and Material Support
in the War on Terror, 54 B.C. L. REV. 711, 740 (2013) (“If the government’s attenuated form of contact
between Mehanna and al Qaeda is ultimately legitimized by the Court then the Material Support
Statute could lead to even further restrictions on the right to free speech.”). Notably, Abel writes
that Humanitarian Law Project does not provide direction on how the incitement standard applies to
terrorist organizations and the material support statute, creating doctrinal uncertainty. Id. at 741-44.
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D. The Nature of the Internet Complicates the Picture
A final issue with bringing a right to receive claim online is the nature of
the Internet. The Communications Decency Act (CDA) may create liability
for Internet companies that host dangerous speech. Additionally, the
borderless nature of the Internet and issues of online anonymity create some
practical concerns for finding plaintiffs and bringing cases. Finally, issues of
Internet geopolitics might disincentivize the government from ensuring that
the right to receive is realized.
Section 230 of the CDA protects technology companies from civil liability
when such companies in good faith “restrict access to . . . material that the
provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected . . . .”194 This liability shield protects companies that
remove online speech.195 On the other hand, a disincentive for removing such
speech is that Internet companies are not considered publishers, and are thus
not liable for speech published on their platforms.196 Even so, if a platform
“knowingly” provides material support to terrorists or provides a space for
inciting speech, then that platform could be held criminally liable.197 Section
230 is effectively the perfect shield and sword for technology companies: if
they find speech problematic, they can remove it; but they will not be held
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2018) (emphasis added).
Of course, companies are incentivized to preserve content, and especially sensational content,
because such content drives engagement, which increases ad revenue. See, e.g., Simon Van Zuylen-Wood,
Likes vs. Hate, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 2019), https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/2019/3/likes-vs-hate
[https://perma.cc/J3KR-FCMG] (“More speech equals more users, and more users equals more ad
revenue.”). This may lead to platforms undermoderating speech that involves harassment, threats,
and abuse, because that drives content sharing. Nicholas Suzor, Molly Dragiewicz, Bridget Harris,
Rosalie Gillet, Jean Burgess & Tess Van Geelen, Human Rights by Design: The Responsibilities of Social
Media Platforms to Address Gender-Based Violence Online, 11 POL’Y & INTERNET 84, 94 (2019) (“The
attention that advertising-driven digital media platforms derive from the spread of highly
inflammatory abusive content can create economic disincentives to deal with abuse.”). But platforms
also have interests that might incentivize them to restrict material, such as protecting their
reputation, or avoiding difficult court cases like Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019).
Thus, companies may knowingly (through policy decisions) or inadvertently (through algorithms
that emphasize sensational content) keep terrorist content up on their platform. But it stands to
reason that companies can remove speech without consequences, and sometimes do. And as noted,
even some removal of content still harms the right to receive information and chills speech.
196 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
197 See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Social Media Accountability for Terrorist Propaganda, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 605, 605 (2017) (arguing that Congress has the authority to prosecute companies for material
support of terrorism if they are “knowingly providing a platform to organizations or individuals who
advocate the commission of terrorist acts.”). But see Force 934 F.3d 53 at 57 (barring civil liability
against Facebook despite Hamas using the platform to coordinate a terrorist attack).
194
195
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liable if they don’t. Worse yet, the government could use technology
companies as a shield for its own liability. By pressuring companies to remove
content, the companies are protected by § 230, and the government is
protected because it is not abridging speech directly.198 And finding evidence
of the government’s pressure on such companies requires additional effort.
Plaintiffs must first prove that the technology company removed speech
because of the government; and then must prove that the government
abridged the right to receive.
Additionally, the borderless nature of the Internet makes it difficult to
determine the identity and location of an anonymous online speaker. As
noted, due to the topology of the Internet, it is difficult to ascertain exactly
where a user is located.199 Thus, a foreign speaker could have an electronic
location within the United States. The current model of technology regulation
depends on a company’s physical location, regardless of where the data is
stored, so the government’s speech-related actions are based on whether a
company is located in the United States, rather than on where the speaker is
located.200 Content removal is thus location-independent, making it more
difficult to determine whether a foreign speaker was censored. This may even
benefit the government, which could be incentivized to censor allegedly
foreign speakers (who do not have First Amendment rights), even if it is
unclear whether they are actually located outside the country. Further, issues
of anonymity on the Internet complicate identifying impacted speakers.
American plaintiffs can bring a right to receive claim in American courts. But
they would first have to identify speech that was being suppressed, for which
they would have to seek anonymous foreign online commentators to reveal
what speech was suppressed and convince them that losing the cloak of their
anonymity is worthwhile for litigation in a country they may have no
attachment to.
Even if plaintiffs can identify speech that was suppressed and bring a
claim either as a listener, or in conjunction with the speaker whose speech was
stifled, courts might be hesitant to get mired in Internet geopolitics. And the
See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 126; Kreimer, supra note 126 and accompanying discussion.
See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying discussion. Additionally, the advent of modern
computing models and network technologies, such as cloud computing, complicate the process of
data geolocation. See, e.g, Nicole Paladi & Antonis Michalas, “One of Our Hosts in Another Country”:
Challenges of Data Geolocation in Cloud Storage, INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS, 2014,
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6934507 [https://perma.cc/6SY9-42ZM] (explaining how
cloud storage systems lead to less control over data).
200 See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Microsoft Ireland, the CLOUD Act, and International Lawmaking
2.0, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 9, 11-16 (2018) (“The CLOUD Act clarifies that service providers
are required to disclose all data in their possession . . . regardless of the location of the data.”).
198
199
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government would surely have strong arguments against such a ruling, even
beyond national security. A ruling in favor of the right to receive that prevents
the government from taking down foreign speech could embolden adversaries
who use the Internet to interfere with American politics,201 or use the Internet
to harm American infrastructure.202 And while proponents of Internet
freedom—this author included203—would celebrate decisions favoring the
right to receive, such decisions could also severely hamstring the U.S.
government’s ability to maintain the current structure of the Internet. Such
hamstringing might happen by hampering other policies which might chill
some online speech and impact the right to receive, but ultimately do ensure
a relatively free and slightly safe Internet.204
In sum, that the speech under consideration is on the Internet is not fatal
to bringing a right to receive claim. But it complicates an already complex
picture, and one that is rife with arcane issues of national security, unknown
unknowns, and conflicting doctrine.

201 See, e.g., ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: VOLUME I 14 (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4PJ-7AWD] (discussing the Russian
social media campaign to sow disinformation during the 2016 election).
202 See, e.g., Gordon Lubold and Dustin Volz, Navy, Industry Partners Are ‘Under Cyber Siege’ by Chinese
Hackers, Review Asserts, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2019, 2:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/navy-industrypartners-are-under-cyber-siege-review-asserts-11552415553 [https://perma.cc/674R-BKSH] (detailing a
massive Chinese hack of the Navy and private companies aimed at stealing military secrets).
203 See Apratim Vidyarthi & Rachel Hulvey, Building Digital Walls and Making Speech and
Internet Freedom (or Chinese Technology) Pay for It, 17 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2021) (discussing how
the Trump Administration’s TikTok ban had repercussions on the U.S. Internet Freedom policy).
204 For example, the government’s prosecution of Julian Assange, ostensibly for endangering
lives of agents and informants by releasing unredacted documents, is a beneficial Internet-related
governmental action that could be curtailed by an expansion of the right to receive. Julian Assange
‘Put Lives at Risk’ by Sharing Unredacted Files, BBC (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk51616077 [https://perma.cc/Z5CS-Y2GT]. The government would be hampered in prosecuting
Assange because while not all the information on WikiLeaks was injurious to national security, the
First Amendment protects the rights of reporters to receive and publicize unlawfully obtained
classified information, including those documents that could have endangered lives. See Rainey
Reitman, The Selective Prosecution of Julian Assange, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/10/selective-prosecution-julian-assange [https://perma.cc/W3ND-5VA3]
(“[T]he First Amendment strongly protects the rights of journalists, including Assange, to publish ruthful
information of clear public interest that they merely receive from whistleblowers, even when the documents
are illegally obtained.”). Thus, the government would find it hard to prosecute callous leakers, while
the right to receive would expand.
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IV. PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO RECEIVE INFORMATION
The right to receive exists in theory, but may be hard to protect in
practice: the government’s actions regarding speech online, combined with
the difficulty of bringing a case, make it impracticable to help American
“listeners” receive information that is being chilled or suppressed through
the courts. A more rights-protective approach is possible through legislation.
A. Pushing Technology Companies Toward Transparency
As the U.S. government reckons with disinformation and hate speech on
social media, an updated approach to how technology companies are
regulated and required to be transparent can facilitate information gathering
on how the right to receive is being impacted. There are two main avenues:
mandatory reporting of the numbers of content takedowns and how many
users are being monitored, as well as a reporting appeals pipeline for those
whose content is removed.
As seen in Table 1 and Section II.B, companies voluntarily report
instances of content monitoring, takedown, and national security requests.
However, what data is reported, the report’s format, accessibility, veracity,
and frequency of the reporting is unregulated. By pushing for mandatory
reporting parameters, a clearer picture of the government’s role in content
regulation on the Internet—and thus its role in stifling the right to receive—
will be available, and can inform plaintiffs of when they have a cognizable
legal claim. The report should include how many requests were granted to
national, state, and local governments of any country at least for (1) content
takedowns, (2) content preservations, (3) account shutdowns, (4) account
monitoring, and (5) NSLs.205 This solution could comfortably slot into calls
for greater transparency in technology companies’ internal content

205 Note that this information is voluntarily provided by some companies. See, e.g., notes and
text accompanying Table 1-A. As noted, the lack of regularity in reporting creates an uneven field
on which to compare statistics.
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moderation policies,206 especially given the role social media has played in the
2016207 and 2020 elections,208 and the ensuing insurrection.209
Such a requirement could come through legislation, given that there is
bipartisan agreement that big technology companies like Facebook and
Amazon should be subject to antitrust action and further regulation.210 Or
enforcement could come through the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s)
existing authority to prohibit “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,”211 which
applies to most Internet platforms.212 An ancillary benefit is that this would
encourage technology platforms to be transparent regarding censorship from
foreign countries as well, giving the U.S. government a clearer picture of how
other countries are pressuring technology firms.
Such legislation could also mandate reporting to users the reason for
content takedown, and providing to users an appeals process. For example,
if the government requested a Twitter user’s account be taken down, the
user should be informed that the government’s request led to the takedown.
The user could then appeal the decision, potentially reinstating their
206 See, e.g., Kevin Roose, How the Biden Administration Can Help Solve Our Reality Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/technology/biden-reality-crisis-misinformation.html (May 20, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/38FV-4WK8] (“[E]xperts recommended . . . much more transparency into the inner
workings of the black-box algorithms that . . . major platforms use . . . .”).
207 See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election, 31 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 211, 212 (2017) (discussing how “fake news” tilted the 2016 election in favor of Donald Trump).
208 See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel, How Misinformation ‘Superspreaders’ Seed False Election Theories, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/technology/election-misinformationfacebook-twitter.html [https://perma.cc/PU4L-YUBZ] (“[A] small group of people—mostly rightwing personalities with outsized influence on social media—helped spread the false voter-fraud
narrative that led to [Stop the Steal] rallies.”); Jeff Jones, In Election 2020, How Did the Media,
Electoral Process Fare? Republicans, Democrats Disagree, KNIGHT FOUND. (Dec. 7, 2020)
https://knightfoundation.org/articles/in-election-2020-how-did-the-media-electoral-process-farerepublicans-democrats-disagree [https://perma.cc/KT64-NLZL] (“Majorities of those who say they
were exposed to misinformation this election year believe [it was through] social media . . . .”).
209 See, e.g., Andrew Marantz, How Social Media Made the Trump Insurrection a Reality, NEW
YORKER (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-social-media-madethe-trump-insurrection-a-reality [https://perma.cc/LBC2-WL7E] (discussing former President
Trump’s use of Twitter to stoke the insurrection); Tonya Mosley & Allison Hagan, How Social Media Fueled
the Insurrection at the U.S. Capitol, WBUR (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.wbur.org/hereandnow/2021/01/07/socialmedia-capitol-mob [https://perma.cc/9QPR-FTQ7] (discussing that “calls for violence ran rampant” on
websites like Parler and apps like Telegram).
210 See, e.g., Rani Molla, Poll: Most Americans want to break up Big Tech, VOX (Jan. 26, 2021, 2:20 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2021/1/26/22241053/antitrust-google-facebook-break-up-big-tech-monopoly
[https://perma.cc/MW9L-8QA7] (“feelings about Big Tech and antitrust are generally consistent among
Democrats and Republicans . . . .”).
211 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018).
212 See, e.g., VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10309, REGULATING BIG
TECH: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2019) (describing the FTC’s authority to regulate social media).
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content. This would be an easier mechanism than engaging in costly
litigation and facing the aforementioned challenges.
A variety of benefits abound from this type of reporting requirement.
Though this legislation is intended to protect just U.S. users (who are
subject to First Amendment protections), because most of these companies
are headquartered in the United States, it protects foreign users’ “right” to
receive information as well, preventing foreign censorship.213 In that vein,
the government currently can thwart such First Amendment concerns by
labeling problematic social media accounts as “foreign,” and thus escaping
First Amendment protections of U.S. persons (e.g., through the
aforementioned difficult litigation). This legislation prevents that type of
loophole, since any social media or website user would have access to these
reports and to an appeals process.
There are, of course, constraints to both these types of legislation. They
would certainly make it more difficult for the government to combat election
disinformation and propaganda pushed by foreign adversaries. But shedding
light on such content takedown does not mean that affected users can always
claim their First Amendment rights are being violated and have the content
reinstated. It simply provides more transparency to users about why their
content is being removed, and sets up communication between platforms and
users such that if content is being removed incorrectly, it can be reinstated.
Informing users that their content has been taken down allows them to know
that their First Amendment right to receive may have been violated. But it
does not mean courts would foreclose the government from taking down
content that has to do with national security, especially where it is clearly
propaganda or election interference.

213 See Zick, supra note 69, at 1579-85 for a discussion of why First Amendment rights do not
traditionally apply to non-U.S. persons, though that may be changing with globalization and
“digitized” speech.
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B. Government Online Accountability Legislation
Government accountability policies are probably as unifying214 as dislike
for North Korea215 or acknowledgment that Jon Stewart is timelessly funny.216
Thus, a policy requiring the government to be more transparent about its
interactions with technology companies might have broad, bipartisan
support. Such legislation should have two goals.
The first goal should be to define broad government disclosure rules: the
FBI, National Security Agency (NSA), and other intelligence organizations
must report to Congress or to the public a list of companies that they provide
content takedown requests and surveillance requests to. This ensures that the
government’s end-run around the Constitution is monitored.217 Additionally,
the legislation should create a limit as to how long data obtained from
technology companies can be stored by the government, in order to prevent
the government from creating an enormous and continuously growing data
profile of individuals that would indefinitely chill their speech.218 Finally,
where the government intends to assert state secrets doctrine regarding
content takedowns or chilled speech,219 litigation must be able to continue

214 See, e.g., Dustin Volz, NSA Phone Surveillance Program Faces an End as Parties Come Together,
WALL ST. J, https://www.wsj.com/articles/nsa-phone-surveillance-program-faces-an-end-as-partiescome-together-11575641253 [https://perma.cc/GZ6E-PTMD] (Dec. 6, 2019, 3:16 PM) (discussing
bipartisan congressional support for terminating an NSA surveillance program despite the Trump
Administration’s wish to preserve it). Terminating such surveillance programs increases government
accountability because many of these programs are secret, but have been abused by government
agencies into collecting vast troves of personal data, and are generally violative of privacy rights,
without giving notice to Americans that the government is watching over them. See generally Ewen
Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillancerevelations-decoded [https://perma.cc/Q7YY-68PJ] (detailing the privacy issues arising from the
NSA’s surveillance program, and how the program may reflect the NSA’s overreaching powers, thus
requiring accountability).
215 Frank Newport, North Korea Remains Least-Popular Country Among Americans, GALLUP (Feb.
20, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/204074/north-korea-remains-least-popular-country-amongamericans.aspx [https://perma.cc/WNN2-EXA9] (showing that eighty-six percent of Americans
hold a negative view of North Korea).
216 See The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Me Lover’s Pizza with Crazy Broad (Comedy Central
television broadcast, June 1, 2011), https://www.cc.com/video/0ect4f/the-daily-show-with-jonstewart-me-lover-s-pizza-with-crazy-broad [https://perma.cc/6GJ3-VMJ9].
217 See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 126; Kreimer, supra note 126 and accompanying discussion.
218 See, e.g., Developments in the Law—Cooperation or Resistance? The Role of Tech Companies in
Government Surveillance, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1722, 1725-26 (2018) (describing the NSA–AT&T
partnership that raised issues of allowing the government to “indulge in its temptation to play “Big
Brother” and “copy[] the whole Internet.”).
219 See supra notes 174–180 and accompanying discussion.
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based on only publicly available information, rather than foreclosing all
litigation due to state secrets.220
The second goal should be to prioritize disclosure rules towards
individuals: while NSLs are generally not subject to disclosure
requirements,221 legislation can mandate that users whose content is being
monitored be informed of this, subject to a time delay so that investigations
are not impacted.222 At minimum, this will ensure that the government is
cautious when it comes to national security-related content takedowns online.
Of course, the cost is that adversaries might know they are being watched. But
it will also provide false positives—such as individuals the government considers
terrorists, but who are not terrorists223—with information that could lead to
remedial measures. In short, such a clause might reduce the overinclusiveness of
the government’s approach to content takedowns.
CONCLUSION
The right to receive is alive in our casebooks. But in reality, we must do a
lot more—through Congress, private entities, and state legislatures—to
ensure that Americans enjoy this aspect of the First Amendment. While the
loss of a few tweets from a suspicious foreigner may seem altogether
infinitesimal, that is just the tip of the iceberg. We don’t know what we don’t
know: our unknown unknowns are the content we don’t know has been
surreptitiously removed by the government or government coordination.
With cyberspace becoming the new frontier for warfare, this space is
likely to become a confusing and conflicting hotbed of removed content and
missed opportunities to hear foreign speech. Between Chinese
disinformation about COVID-19224 and Russian propaganda favoring the

220 See generally Janelle Smith, Comment, Jeppesen Dataplan: Redefining the State-Secrets
Doctrine in the Global War on Terror, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1073, 1100 (2011) for a detailed discussion on
this approach.
221 In re Nat’l Sec. Letter v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2017).
222 There is already a six-month delay in allowing technology companies to report how many NSLs
they have received, indicating adequate precedence. Reuters Staff, supra note 101.
223 See, e.g., Brennan Ctr. for Just. v. United States Dep’t of Just., No. 18-1860, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 122947, at *54 (D.D.C. 2021) (noting that in some cases, the DOJ may have “cases [that] were
designated as terrorism-related by accident”).
224 See, e.g., Erika Kinetz, COVID Conspiracy Shows Vast Reach of Chinese Disinformation,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 15, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/beijing-media-coronaviruspandemic-conspiracy-only-on-ap-e696b32d4c3e9962ac0bdbdae2991466 [https://perma.cc/89R5P8HA] (discussing the Chinese government’s use of the Internet to spread disinformation about the
origins of COVID-19).
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losing candidate in 2020,225 the board is set. The incentive for the government
to interfere in speech is growing, with some reason. The right to receive is
likely to be a casualty, unless lawyers and lawmakers work to ensure that it
can be realized in practice. This Comment, though limited in scope, has
provided some solutions. However, further research is needed on how to
balance an effective response to disinformation, election interference, and
foreign government censorship online, and the right to receive information.
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that more must be done before our image of this
right is no longer a mirage, but tethered in reality.

225 See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel & Julian E. Barnes, Russians Again Targeting Americans with Disinformation,
Facebook and Twitter Say, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/01/technology/facebook-russiadisinformation-election.html [https://perma.cc/4XAE-SQ7E] (Sep. 22, 2020) (describing Russian attempts
to use social media to support Donald Trump).
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All figures are for the entirety of 2020 unless otherwise stated.
Note that these are reported in increments due to disclosure requirements, and are subject to
a six-month reporting delay. Reuters Staff, Web Companies Give First Look at Secret U.S. Government
Data Requests, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2014, 3:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/internet-nsa/webcompanies-give-first-look-at-secret-u-s-government-data-requests-idUKL2N0L81E320140203
[https://perma.cc/4RB4-GQUD].
3 See id. for an explanation of the data range. As can be seen, most companies report in bands of 500.
4 Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 4th Quarter 2020, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/
[https://perma.cc/UD7P-9EKF].
5 Transparency
Center:
Restrictions
by
Product
(United
States),
FACEBOOK,
https://transparency.fb.com/data/content-restrictions/country/US
[https://perma.cc/GRR7-HPGQ].
Note that these are content restrictions, rather than content takedowns, since Facebook generally does not
take down content, but rather restricts its viewing in the geographical locations where it is illegal to view
that data. But the effect of these restrictions on the right to receive is the same: American viewers do not
get to see that content.
6 Transparency Center: Global Restrictions, FACEBOOK, https://transparency.fb.com/data/contentrestrictions/global [https://perma.cc/3CL5-A38W]. Facebook notes that “[w]hile uncommon, we will
occasionally receive legal demands that assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, and request that we restrict the
availability of content globally.” Id.
7 Transparency Center: Government Requests for User Data (United States), FACEBOOK,
https://transparency.fb.com/data/government-data-requests/country/US [https://perma.cc/K8A9ZDPE]. Note that data for January to June 2020 and July to December periods had to be summed,
since data for those two ranges was separately provided.
8 Transparency Center: Preservation Requests, FACEBOOK, https://transparency.fb.com/data/governmentdata-requests/preservation-requests [https://perma.cc/XP2G-KU3S]. Note that the data here are from the
downloaded data rather than that presented on the website, filtered by country. There may be some
discrepancies between the website and the raw data.
9 Transparency Report: Government Requests for User Data (United States), supra endnote 7
(“Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act”). Note once again that this is just the sum of two bands, so
the real number might be lower than the maximum.
10 Id. (“National Security Letters”). Note once again that this is just the sum of two bands, so
the real number might be lower than the maximum.
11 Because Google searches are not always made by account holders, the scope of the company’s
reach is not defined by a “user base.”
12 Google Transparency Reports by Country/Region: Government Requests to Remove Content,
GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/government-removals/by-country?hl=en [https://
perma.cc/KQZ3-CFBJ] (click the tab that says “Government Requests”; click on “select
countries/regions”; choose “United States”; and filter by reasons (for “privacy and security”) or by
requesters (for police and other government officials) under the Items graph; and then select the
appropriate date range).
13 Google
Transparency Report: Global Requests for User Information, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview?hl=en [https://perma.cc/BG3Q-42EH] (click
the “Global Requests” tab; then select United States under “Requests by reporting period” graph; and then
see data for 2020 range).
14 Id.
15 Google Transparency Report: US National Security Requests, GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.
google.com/user-data/us-national-security?hl=en [https://perma.cc/5F2J-2MBG].
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As of 2020. Jacob Kastrenakes, Apple Says There Are Now Over 1 billion Active iPhones, VERGE
(Jan. 27, 2021, 5:59 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/27/22253162/iphone-users-total-numberbillion-apple-tim-cook-q1-2021 [https://perma.cc/JJD6-CV2U].
18 Apple Transparency Report: United States, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/transparency/us.html
[https://perma.cc/3Y4G-UBKE] (select Date Ranges for both halves of 2020 and look at the “Accounts
Specified in the Requests” category under “Account Restriction / Account Deletion”).
19 Id. (see “Emergency” under “Requests Received” category).
20 Id. (see “Account Preservation” category).
21 Id. (see “National Security – FISA Content Requests” category).
22 Id. (see “National Security Letter Requests” category).
23 As of 2019. Number of Monthly Active Twitter Users Worldwide from 1st Quarter 2010 to 1st
Quarter 2019, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/282087/number-of-monthly-activetwitter-users [https://perma.cc/2RRL-HQFJ].
24 Twitter
Transparency
Report:
United
States,
TWITTER
(Jan.
22,
2021),
https://transparency.twitter.com/en/reports/countries/us.html#2020-jan-jun [https://perma.cc/S8R8-HVFT]
(see “Removal Requests”).
25 Id. (see “Compare countries” and select “Information requests”). Note that it is unclear
whether this number is for all of 2020 or just the first or second half.
26 Id. (select “More information” under “Information requests”).
27 Id.
28
As of 2019. Reddit’s 2019 Year in Review, REDDIT (Dec. 4, 2019),
https://redditblog.com/2019/12/04/reddits-2019-year-in-review/ [https://perma.cc/99PD-WVVY].
29 Reddit Transparency Report 2020, REDDIT (2020), https://www.redditinc.com/policies/transparencyreport-2020-1 [https://perma.cc/8BP6-XKW3] (see Chart 20).
30 Id. (see Chart 21).
31 Id. (see “US National Security Requests”).
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